Conversion and the Courts by Neufeldt, Ronald
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies
Volume 13 Article 7
2000
Conversion and the Courts
Ronald Neufeldt
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs
The Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies is a publication of the Society for Hindu-Christian Studies. The digital version is made available by Digital
Commons @ Butler University. For questions about the Journal or the Society, please contact cbauman@butler.edu. For more information about
Digital Commons @ Butler University, please contact fgaede@butler.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neufeldt, Ronald (2000) "Conversion and the Courts," Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies: Vol. 13, Article 7.
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7825/2164-6279.1227
Conversion and the Courts 
Ronald N eufeldt 
University of Calgary 
CONVERSION FROM ONE religion to 
another has been a thorny issue throughout 
the history or the Indian subcontinent. 
Recently the controversy over conversion 
has received new life, given a number of 
events which in effect resulted in a great 
deal of debate over the place of Christians 
within· the State of India. Perhaps the two 
most recent controversial events were the 
gruesome murder of Rev. Staines and his 
two children in Orissa and the visit of the 
Pope to India. 
Much of the ensuing discussion has 
been of the emotional variety, dealing not 
only with the killing of innocents, but also 
the justifiability of missionary work and 
conversions, and the place of minorities 
within India. In all of the discussion that has 
taken place, particularly on the ListServ, 
little attention has been given to legal and 
constitutional issues other than a lengthy 
reference to the celebrated Rev. Stanislaus 
case by Ashok Chowgule. This amounted to 
a lengthy quote from Dr Praveen Bhai 
Togadia, the Secretary-General of the 
Vishva Hindu Parishad. In that statement Dr 
Togadia claims that the Supreme Court in its 
ruling on the Stanislaus case rejected in toto 
the claims of the Christian community. The 
right pressed was presumably the right to 
convert. Whether the spin given to the 
judgement of the Court by Dr Togadia is 
correct or not, one thing is clear, conversion, 
and by implication the position of minorities 
in India, remains a controversial issue, both 
in public debate and in the courts. I will not 
attempt an overview of relevant cases in this 
short paper, although this is, it seems to me, 
needed badly. Rather, I will attempt to use 
the Stanislaus case and its background to ad-
dress Hindu perceptions (misperceptions?) 
of Christians particularly with respect to 
propagation. Propagation is, I would argue, 
the single most important issue for the future 
of Hindu-Christian relationships. 
The Context 
In 1967 the State of Orissa enacted the 
Orissa Freedom of Religion Act. In the 
stated objectives for the Act, the State 
referred to maladjustments and threats to 
law and order which may be brought about 
by conversions of a certain kind. 
Conversion in its very process involves 
an act of undennining another's faith. 
The process becomes all the more 
objectionable when this is brought 
about by recourse to methods like force, 
fraud, material inducement and 
exploitation of one's poverty, simplicity 
and ignorance. Conversion or an 
attempt to conversion in the above 
manner, besides creating 
maladjustments in social life, also give 
rise to problems of law and order. l . 
The Act was ostensibly aimed at 
conversions brought about by force, fraud, 
material . inducements, and exploitation. 
Important for our consideration. is the 
meaning given to some 'of these items. 
Conversion, for example, means "renounc-
ing one religion and adopting another". 
Force includes the "threat of divine 
displeasure". Fraud includes "misrepresenta-
tion or any other fraudulent contrivance.,,2 
Interesting as well is the reference to the 
conversion of minors, women, and members 
of scheduled castes or tribes. These sections 
of society were seen as being in need of 
special protection. Therefore the penalties 
for conversion in such cases were much 
more severe than were the penalties for 
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converting adult males who were not 
members of the scheduled castes or tribes.3 
A similar Act was passed by the 
Madhya Pradesh Legislature in 1968. It is 
essentially the same as the Orissa Freedom 
of Religion Act with the exception that it 
requires that conversions be registered with 
the District Magistrate. 
A third act which did not become part 
of the Stanislaus case, but which is worth 
considering, is the Arunachal Pradesh 
Freedom of Religion Act passed in 1978: In 
many respects it is the same as the Orissa 
and the Madhya Pradesh Acts. In one 
important respect it is different. Its aim is to 
prohibit conversion from indigenous faith 
(this includes Buddhism, Vaishnavism, and 
nature ·worship), by means of force, fraud, or 
inducement.4 Of particular interest in this 
Act is the appeal to indigenous faith. 
Conversion from indigenous faith is to be 
prevented as far as this is possible because 
ostensibly such conversion is seen as a 
threat of some sort. Faiths not mentioned in 
the definition of indigenous are by 
implication clearly to be seen as alien. 
Public order is to be seen as somehow con-
nected to adherence to indigenous faith. 
Thus any inducements such as appeals to 
divine displeasure or criticisms of indi-
genous faiths become threats to public order. 
The Case 
Both the Orissa Act and the Madhya 
Pradesh Act came under challenge at the 
State level before being heard on appeal by 
the Supreme Court. In Orissa, in the case of 
Yulitha Hyde vs State (1973), the challenge 
against the Orissa Act was made on two 
grounds, namely, "(a) The State Legislature 
has no legislative competency to legislate on 
the matters covered by the Act, and (b) The 
Act infringes the fundamental right 
guaranteed under Art. 25 of the Con-
stitution".s The Act was eventually judged 
by the Court to be ultra vires. For our 
purposes . the interesting and pertinent 
aspects are the arguments surrounding 
propagation and conversion. In his judge-
ment, Justice R. N. Misra pointed out that ' 
the petitioners (both Catholic and Protestant) 
Conversion and the Courts 13 
admitted to various reasons for conversion -
satisfaction of basic physical wants, the 
exemplary life led by Christians, the 
attraction of Christian beliefs, escape from a 
depressed class, and mild threats such as 
divine displeasure.6 From the Christian side 
propagation was seen as an integral part of 
Christianity. That is, Christ had given the 
mandate to Christians to make disciples, and 
Christians felt compelled to share the gift of 
salvation with others. That propagation was 
part of the religious duty of Christians was 
accepted by the Advocate for the 
Government of Orissa. 
But, Justice Misra, appealing to the 
judgement in Durgah Committee vs Hussain 
Ali (1961), went beyond this stating that 
propagation is part of the religious duty of 
Christians and therefore a guaranteed right 
under the Constitution of India. We have 
here one of the few judgements in which 
conversion is seen as a right contemplated 
by the articles on religious freedom. 
The true scope of the guarantee under 
article 25 (1) of the Constitution, 
. therefore, must be taken to extend to 
propagate religion and as a necessary 
corollary of this proposition, conversion 
into one's own religion has to be 
included in the right so far as Christian 
citi,zenship is concemed.7 
Speaking for one aspect of the Act, Justice 
Misra suggested that the threat of divine 
displeasure and the threat of excom-
munication did in fact constitute forms of 
force and threat. However, the definition of 
inducement in the Act was seen as being too 
broad in that "even invoking the blessings of 
the Lord or to say that 'by His grace your 
soul shall be elevated' may come within the 
mischief of the term". 8 
The Act was, in the end, judged to be 
unconstitutional on three grounds, namely, 
article 25 (1) guarantees conversion as part 
of the Christian religion, the definition of 
inducement is too vague, and the State has 
no power to enact the legislation envisioned 
by the Act since th~ Act deals with religion 
and not public order. The latter falls under 
the competency of State legislation, but the 
former does not.9 
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Two years later the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court heard a challenge to its own 
religious freedom act in Rev. Stanislaus vs 
State (1975). Since the provisions of the Act 
and the challenges to those provisions were 
similar to the Orissa Freedom of Religion 
Act, Justice C. J. Tare made substantial 
reference to the judgement in the case of 
. Yulitha Hyde vs State. However, the purpose 
of these references was not to support the 
judgement in Yulitha Hyde but to argue 
against that judgement. 
Appealing to the preamble of the 
Madhya Pradesh Act, Justice Tare· argued 
that the Act did fall within the competence 
of the State Legislature. Conversions 
brought about by force, fraud, or allurement 
were for him matters of public order. The 
Act therefore had to do with public order 
and not simply with religion as the 
judgement in Yulitha Hyde seemed to 
indicate. In the view of Justice Tare, the Act 
fell within the competence of the State 
Legislature because it had to do with public 
order and not simply with religious freedom. 
Had the Act been confmed only to freedom 
of religion it would not have fallen within 
. the competence of the State.IO 
Justice Tare also found, in opposition to 
the judgement of Justice Misra, that the 
provisions of the' Act did not violate Article 
25 (1) of the Constitution. Shifting the 
argument away from the issue of the broad 
definitions of allurement, force, and fraud, 
Justice Tare argued that the provisions in the 
Act merely prohibit conversions by spurious 
means and therefore guarantee religious 
freedom even to those who might be 
amenable to such conversions. The 
arguments here were significant in that they 
were repeated with some changes in the 
Supreme Court decision. On the one hand he 
argued that "freedom of religion cannot be 
construed to be the right of an individual to 
encroach upon similar freedom of other 
individuals by questionable means".l1 On 
the other hand, to attempt to convert using 
force, fraud, or allurement might indeed 
create a threat for public order, here defined 
as community as opposed to the individual.I2 
Two other points concerning the 
decision of Justice Tare need to be 
emphasized since these become issues in the 
Supreme Court decision in the same case. 
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court 
judgements in Ratilal Punamchand Gandhi 
vs State of Bombay (1954) and Com-
misioner, Hindu Religious Endowments vs 
Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar (1954), the 
Justice emphasized that the purpose of 
propagation was simply the edification of 
others. I3 This is quite different from the 
understanding of conversion in Yulitha Hyde 
where conversion was seen as a legitimate 
purpose of propagation - indeed as a right 
recognized by the Constitution in the case of 
Christians. Secondly, playing on the 
wealrnesses of people amenable to force, 
fraud, or allurement is a contravention of 
their own right to religious freedom. To 
have an Act that prohibits such activities is, 
in fact, to guarantee religious freedom to 
weaker sections of society. The issue here is 
not to protect against conversion per se, but 
to protect against conversion of those who 
might be amenable to fraud. The Act then is 
seen as a protective measure for those who 
need the protection of the State. Whether or 
not the argument holds any water, it needs to 
be pointed out here since it is used in the 
Supreme Court decision in Stanislaus, but 
with a rilUch wider application than that 
contemplated by Justice Tare. 
Both cases, because they presented 
similar issues and arguments, were heard 
together by the Supreme Court in 1977. The 
decision of the Court was written by Chief 
Justice Ray. The two issues singled out by 
the Chief Justice were the right to propagate 
and the competency of the State Legislatures 
to enact the Freedom of Religion Acts. 
Emphasizing that the Acts were aimed at 
forcible conversion and therefore have to do 
not so much with religion as they have to do 
with the maintenance of public order, the 
Chief Justice argued that the States had the 
competency to enact the impugned 
legislation. In making this ruling the Chief 
Justice referred for support to Ramjilal Modi 
vs State of U. P. (1957), in which it was 
emphasized that a law relafJ.Ilg to religion 
can be enacted in the interests of public 
----
I 
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Of interest in the statements of the 
Chief Justice is the argument that the mere 
apprehension of disturbance to public order 
is enough to justify the impugned Act and 
the argument that conversions effected in a 
manner reprehensible to the conscience of 
the ~ommunity are justifiably prohibited by 
the Impugned Acts. This argument, it would 
seem, opens up the possibility of prohibiting 
any conversion if the community decides 
that it is reprehensible. If this is an 
acceptable conclusion, and at times this 
seems to be the gloss that organizations like 
the VHP sometimes put on the decision, 
then the Acts serve potentially to. prohibit 
any conversions whatsoever. Or, it makes 
the right to convert or to seek conversions 
dependent on the will or vote of the 
majority. This I would suggest goes beyond 
what the framers of the Constitution wanted 
and what the Constitution itself suggests. 
Furthermore, it is precisely the kind of 
situation that the framers of the Constitution 
were trying to prevent, i.e. that the exercise 
of religious freedom should become depend-
ent on the will of the majority community. 
. On the issue of propagation the concern 
of the Chief Justice turns on the argument 
made by the appellant that implied in the 
right to propagate is the right to convert a 
person to one's own religion. Taking a 
narrow view of the word propagate, and 
fmding support in Ratilal vs The State of 
Bombay (1954) the Chief Justice argued that 
the right to propagate is confmed to 
transmitting or spreading the tenets of one's 
own religion. It will be recalled that in the 
Ratilal case it was argued that the purpose of 
propagation is edification, not conversio:n. 
Speaking to the rights enshrined in Article 
25 Ray states: 
What the Article grants is not the right 
to convert another person to one's own 
religion, but to transmit or spread one's 
religion by an exposition of its tenets. It 
has to be remembered that Article 25 
(1) guarantees "freedom of conscience" . 
to every citizen, and not merely to the 
followers of one particular religion, and 
that, in turn, postulates that there is no 
Conversion and the Courts 15 
fundamental right to convert another 
person to one's own religion because if 
a person purposely undertakes the 
conversion of another person to his 
religion, as distinguished from his effort 
to transmit or spread the tenets of his 
religion, that would impinge on the 
"freedom of conscience" guaranteed to 
all citizens of the country alike. 15 
The language of the Chief Justice would 
seem to suggest that if I am offended by 
someone's attempt to convert me, this is 
enough to make the attempt illegal. The 
. Chief Justice also appears to be saying that 
since conversion does not appear in the 
fundamental rights it cannot by implication 
be included as a right even if my religion 
commands that I seek to convert in order to 
fulfil my religious duties. 
Conclusion 
How is one to understand the language in 
this judgement? It is possible to take a very 
narrow and literal approach as has been 
. done by spokespersons for the VHP and to 
claim that Christians do not have the right to 
convert another. This I would suggest would 
be to take the pronouncements of the Chief 
. Justice out of context. One has to see the 
language of the judgement in the context of 
the Freedom of Religion Acts and the M. P. 
High Court case on which the Chief Justice 
seems to depend. The Acts themselves in 
. ' 
spIte of the restraints placed on anyone 
seeking to convert another do not prohibit 
such activity. They do prohibit seeking 
conversions by force, fraud, or inducement 
or allurement. The issue in both Acts is to 
prohibit conversions by questionable means. 
If this more contextual approach to the 
decision in the Stanislaus case is correct 
then I would suggest that the claim that the 
Court has said that no one has the right to 
convert is a red herring. To put the issue in 
those simplistic terms is to ignore the 
complexity of the issue and the history of 
the interpretation of Article 25. There is a 
distinction to be ma,de between saying that I 
have a right to convert someone and that I 
have a right to seek to convert someone. The 
latter is not ruled out even by the narrow 
4
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understanding of propagation, which says 
that I have the right to propagate only for the 
sake of edification or spreading the tenets of 
my religion. Relevant court cases taken as a 
whole seem to assert two rights implied by 
the fundamental rights. I have the right to 
convert to another religion and I have the 
right to seek to convince others about the 
rightness of my views. As cases dealing with 
freedom of speech suggest, without the latter 
as implied, the provision for freedom of 
speech would be an empty provision. 16 
Furthermore it needs to be pointed out that 
the framers of the Constitution understood 
that conversions would flow from the 
exercise of the fundamental rights and the 
courts have tended to see things the same 
way. Conversion is seen by the courts to be 
a part of the fabric of a multireligious 
society that guarantees to people the right to 
propagate their views. 
Even if one grants a contextual reading 
of Stanislaus, there are problematic aspects 
in the language of the Chief Justice. First, he 
seems to suggest that to insist on conversion 
as a fundamental right is to move in the 
direction of employing questionable means. 
This is to conflate the insistence on the right 
to convert with the right to force one's views 
on someone. This is, in the eyes of the Chief 
Justice, particUlarly pernicious with respect 
to the weaker sections of society which the 
Acts were designed to defend. The language 
taken at face value is similar to the rhetoric 
found in the infamous Niyogi Commission 
Report and in some of the arguments put 
forward against the right to propagate during 
the Constituent Assembly debates. It is the 
kind of rhetoric that suggests that conversion 
can only be conversion by force, fraud, or 
allurement - that there cannot be conversion 
of another kind. It is the kind of rhetoric that 
suggests that conversion is by definition an 
act of violence and disruption. Pertinent here 
is the definition of conversion provided in 
the Freedom of Religion Acts - that 
conversion is ''renouncing one's religion and 
adopting another". Such a simplistic defini-
tion can only result in the misrepresentation 
of the relationship of potential converts to 
the community and the State. I have in mind 
here the business of dual allegiances, a 
reality which is recognized in the histories 
of converts and by the courts themselves in 
cases dealing with conversion and member-
ship in scheduled castes. 17 
Secondly, it seems to be the view of the 
Chief Justice that any conversion that· 
offends the conscience of the community is 
reprehensible and liable to be a threat to 
public order. Such arguments open up the 
possibility to prohibiting any conversion 
whatsoever if the community decides that it 
is for one reason or another reprehensible. If 
this is a correct interpretation it would make 
any attempt to seek a conversion dependent 
on the will of the majority. This would seem 
to lead to the very situation that the 
Constitution of India seeks to avoiCl, namely, 
that the exercise of religious freedom 
becomes dependent on the will of the 
religious majority. 
Thirdly, to argue that the mere 
apprehension of disturbance to public order 
is enough to prohibit or to seriously 
circumscribe conversion activity is to argue 
against the direction that the Courts ruive 
taken in cases dealing with insult and 
religious procession. The Courts have 
argued that to justify a piece oflegislation as 
being in the interests of public order there 
must be more than simply a perception that 
there might be a disturbance of some sort. 
The responsibility to protect public order is 
not met simply by placing a ban on the 
propagation of one's views or a ban on 
religious processions. IS 
Finally, the judgement of Chief Justice 
Ray goes far further in' the protection of 
weaker sections of society than the courts 
have been willing to go in cases dealing with 
insult to religion. The subtext of his 
judgement seems to be that because 
Christians prey on weaker sections of 
society in their conversion efforts, these 
weaker sections need special protection to 
guarantee their freedom of conscience. It is 
on this point that constitutional experts have 
found the decision to be both wanting and 
potentially pernicious. In his monumental 
work on constitutional law in India H. M. 
Servai, former Advocate General of Maha-
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rashtra, takes issue with Chief Justice Ray's 
emphasis on freedom of conscience at the 
expense of freedom of religion. He insists 
that the two must harmonize to provide for a 
system that gives free choice in matters of 
religion. Likewise the provision for propaga-
tion must be seen as harmonizing with the 
freedom of conscience. 
The right to propagate religion gives a 
meaning to freedom of choice, for 
choice involves not only laiowledge but 
an act of will. To propagate religion is 
not only to impart laiowledge and to 
spread it more widely, but to produce 
intellectual and moral conviction 
leading to action, namely, the adoption 
of that. religion. Successful propagation 
of religion would result in conversion: 
Ray C. J. mistakenly believed that if A 
deliberately set out to convert B by 
propagating A's religion, that would 
impinge on B' s "freedom of 
conscience" . 
... conversion does not in any way 
interfere with the freedom of conscience 
but is a fulfilment of it and gives 
meaning to it. It is submitted that the 
above view harmonizes with the 
legislative history of Art. 25(1) and the 
inclusion of the word "propagate" in it. 
It harmonizes with a matter of common 
laiowledge that several religions are 
proselytizing religions as a matter of 
religious duty, and it harmonizes with 
the meaning of the words "propagate", 
"convert", and "conversion", "freedom 
of conscience" and the right freely to 
profess and practise religion. 19 
The argument that propagation is to be for 
edification only is, I would suggest an 
argument that caters to elements of the 
majority religious community. Certainly it is 
an idea with which the majority religious 
community will be more comfortable than it 
will be with the idea of propagation for the 
sake of conversion. But it is not the only line 
of argument taken by the Courts. As I have 
suggested earlier in this treatment there are 
cases in which the decisions challenge the 
notion that propagation must be for 
edification only. This is clearly the line of 
argument that Servai takes m his 
commentary on the Stanislaus case. 
Conversion and the Courts 17 
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